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THE FRAGMENTED LIBERTY CLAUSE
REBECCA L. BROWN*
This conference charitably opens with a gift. Its organizers
begin by granting to substantive due process the right to exist.
This is not a small or insignificant gift. Political experience
suggests how big a step it is for one antagonist to grant the
other's right to exist. With that matter conceded, it seems, the
contenders need not fight the battle for legitimacy, but may
devote all their energies to the definition of boundaries.
But this gift is a Trojan Horse; it poses a menacing challenge
hidden deep within. If the proponents of substantive due process
cannot defend its boundaries satisfactorily, then evidently the
principle of enforceable liberty itself is at risk of being banished
to oblivion with a pronouncement of illegitimacy across the
board. Alan Meese admits as much:
The absence of such an explanation [for the way in which the
Supreme Court has treated liberty], or, what may be worse,
the provision of an explanation that will not withstand
scrutiny, suggests that the distinction between personal
rights and economic rights, and, with it, the legitimacy of the
enterprise of substantive due process, is an illusion.'
This Essay is an effort to rout the troops crouched in the bow-
els of the marvelous Horse, to challenge them with a strong
offensive charge on behalf of vigorous liberty protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment. More prosaically, my purpose is to
suggest some of the limitations of what I will call the "conserva-
tive critique" of substantive due process, a critique taken up in
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I am grateful to my colleagues Barry
Friedman, John Goldberg, and Bob Rasmussen for their generous suggestions on this
paper and Amanda Frazier for her valuable research assistance.
1. Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and
the Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 8 (1999)
(emphasis added).
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Meese's paper.' The foundation of that critique is that, because
the Framers valued some of the types of liberty that we now call
economic rights, modern courts should give robust protection to
these rights, and only these rights, against most types of govern-
ment regulation.' The judiciary's failure since 1937 to do so, the
critique maintains, constitutes a breach of fidelity to the Consti-
tution itself and casts serious doubt on any judicial effort to pro-
tect liberties of any kind from state abridgment.
The conservative critique propounds impoverished notions of
both liberty and fidelity. This Essay offers some reminders about
the development of liberty in this country, as well as some his-
torical, theoretical, and common sense considerations that might
guide us in the development of a better approach to the protec-
tion of liberty under the Constitution.
Professor Meese is on the right track when he questions the
relatively recent splitting of liberty into two distinct categories,
economic and personal.4 He correctly questions the Supreme
Court's decision to apply strict scrutiny to laws curtailing per-
sonal liberties while seeking only a rational basis for laws im-
pinging upon economic liberties. This Artificial pigeonhol-
ing-particularly when the arbitrary choice of pigeonhole has
such radically significant consequences-serves neither history
nor principle. Though I grant Meese this first step of his argu-
ment, my concession ends here. Meese goes astray when he
suggests that the categories themselves are meaningful, but that
2. See id. at 10-11. Similar complaints have been raised in numerous other writ-
ings by conservative scholars. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original
Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823 (1986) (arguing that judges
should be limited by the historical intention of the constitutional text to protecting
rights as they are stated in the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Constitution of Business, GEO. MASON L. REV., Winter 1988, at 53
(criticizing the revival of substantive due process in modern jurisprudence); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85 (arguing that, when
confronted with a substantive due process issue, the Supreme Court is likely to give
the legislature deference in its analysis of "substance" but not "process"); Wayne
McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY.
L.J. 397 (1993) (arguing that substantive due process has limited value only in pro-
tecting certain economic rights).
3. See Meese, supra note 1, at 16-17; supra note 2.
4. See Meese, supra note 1, at 4-8.
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if substantive due process is to be "principled,"5 then the specific
freedoms occupying privileged and nonprivileged positions
should simply switch places. He does not go far enough in taking
on the categorical jurisprudence that characterizes modern anal-
ysis of liberty under the Due Process Clause.
In place of the dichotomous reasoning that has developed
around the question of constitutional liberty, I propose a more
integrated, common sense understanding of the place of liberty
in the roster of individual rights protected by judicial scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment. A critical comment on the
conservative critique of substantive due process, which would
still allow for the fragmenting of liberty into two categories, is
one qtep in the process of reaching that goal.
This Essay discusses the way in which courts have tradition-
ally understood a constitutional claim to liberty under the Due
Process Clause, suggestihg that liberty did not originate as a
fragmented or hierarchical notion. Rather, liberty represented
the freedom to do what individuals wished to do, without privi-
leging some activities over others. Liberty, however, has never
been understood as absolute, and thus the courts came to under-
stand liberty as a concept shaped by the needs of the communi-
ty. Accordingly, the nature of reasons that a state offers for
restraining liberty is a key component of the meaning of liberty
itself. Courts lost sight of this idea of liberty as a balance be-
tween individual freedom and the needs of a democratically
governed society, and the protection of liberty has suffered as a
consequence.
I. THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF LIBERTY
Very early in our nation's history, and with conceptual roots
reaching back to seventeenth-century English legal and political
theory, state courts undertook what we might today see as a
preliminary consideration of liberty as a constraint on state
power.6 At the time, it was not phrased or conceived in those
5. Id. at 11.
6. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the
Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 315 passim (1999). Pro-
fessor Ely traces the use of "due process" as a means to curtail governmental power
19991
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terms; only later did liberty develop into a notion of a shield
that might be erected to protect the individual from the exercise
of state power.7 Instead, the focus was on the limits of state
power itself.' The question facing early courts was where state
governmental power comes from and where appropriate limits
must be drawn, based on the nature of the authority to make
law.9
The Supreme Court contributed to this effort with its famous
early decisions in Calder v. Bull0 and Fletcher v. Peck," in
which the Court recognized the effect of "general principles of
our political institutions" in limiting the power of government.'
"The purposes for which men enter into society will determine
the nature and terms of the Social compact . . " Those terms,
together with the nature of a free republican society, contained
some inherent limitations on what legislatures might do." The
precise contours of such a limitation, of course, remained to be
delineated, but there was much common ground in the under-
standing of the role of the state.
State courts were a much more common source of reflection
upon the question of limiting government power. A helpful ex-
ample is In re Vandine,"5 a Massachusetts Supreme Court opin-
ion written in 1828. The law challenged in that case prohibited
unlicensed persons from removing filth or refuse from houses in
Boston. 6 Vandine, prosecuted for violating the law, did not deny
that "the city may direct the time and manner of removing
filth," but argued that "they have no right to say that it shall be
in this country as far back as the late eighteenth century, primarily in state courts
and on the basis of state law. See id. at 328. Even in antebellum America, "[d]ue
process, then, helped mark the bounds of legitimate government." Id. at 345. My
focus is on the federal courts' adoption of those views in their interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
7. See id. at 322.
8. See id. at 324.
9. See id. at 331.
10. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
11. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
12. Id. at 139.
13. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388.
14. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135.
15. 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 187 (1828).
16. See id. at 187.
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removed only by persons having a license."' 7 The court acknowl-
edged the prevailing rule that if the restraint is "unreasonable,
it is void";18 "if necessary for the good government of the society,
it is good."19 Accordingly, "regard must be had to its object and
necessity."20 Three conclusions followed: first, "the law [was]
reasonable"; second, it was "well adapted to preserve the health
of the city"; and third, it was "within the power of the govern-
ment to prescribe."21 The logical relation among these three
statements, all contained in a single sentence, is evident from
the discussion: because the city had good reasons for passing this
law, reasons that related to the common good of the city, it con-
sequently was within the government's power.22
From the vantage point of the conservative critique in 1999,
certainly one could complain that Vandine's right to pursue an
occupation had been "trammeled by the legislature at will."
23
Even at this early point in history, however, courts recognized
that rights to liberty were not absolute, but were constrained by
a notion of the common good.' A great deal can be learned
about early notions of liberty and power from this court's treat-
ment of the license issue.
The court in Vandine distinguished a seemingly similar case
presented by the defendant, and explained why it was not con-
trolling:
The mayor and commonalty of London made a by-law, that
no carman within the city should go with his cart, without
license from the wardens of such an hospital, under a certain
penalty for each offence; and it was held to be a void by-law,
because it was in restraint of the liberty of the trade of a
carman, and it was held to be unreasonable, because it went
to the private benefit of the wardens of the hospital, and was
in the nature of a monopoly.'
17. Id at 189.
18. Id at 190-91.
19. Id. at 192.
20. Id. at 191.
21. Id. at 192.
22. See id. at 191.
23. Meese, supra note 1, at 8.
24. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
25. Vandine, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) at 191.
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Howard Gillman has insightfully pointed out a key feature of
the comparison between the valid and the invalid laws discussed
in Vandine:
[Ilt is clear that the distinction does not rest on the extent to
which market freedom is impaired-the impairment is identi-
cal in each case-but rather on the consideration of whether
the interference legitimately advances the general welfare of
the community or illegitimately advances the particular wel-
fare of private interests.26
Two identical interferences with liberty may meet with opposite
results under due process analysis depending on the state's
reasons for its action.
This case quite explicitly illustrates the heart of liberty juris-
prudence both before and after passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Everything a person may wish to do can be un-
derstood to fall within the Supreme Court's own definition of
"liberty": "to be free in the enjoyment of all [one's] faculties; to
be free to use them in all lawful ways ... ." 2s The feature distin-
guishing valid interferences with any liberty from invalid ones is
the reason the state offers for the interference. If the state ar-
ticulates a valid reason to interfere with liberty, it will prevail; if
it can offer no reason or only an illegitimate reason, then its law
will fail. Thus, liberty is held by all for all acts, but it is "held on
such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing
power of the State .... 2 9
26. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 51-52 (1993).
27. This may not seem so strange when one remembers that a similar result at-
tends treatment under the Equal Protection Clause. If two people of the same mi-
nority race are denied the same job, one out of discriminatory intent and the other
because she failed a test that disproportionately disadvantages members of her race,
the first will have recourse under the Constitution although the second will not. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ('[C]ases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a
racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact."). The legitimacy of the state's action is evaluated not on
the basis of the burden borne by the individual but rather by the reasons that the
state offers to justify its action. See id. at 246.
28. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
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This simple proposition explains why the term "liberty" was
not the focus of debate or discussion in the early days of the
Fourteenth Amendment and for decades afterward. A claim to
liberty had to be neither established nor defended. Until the
middle of the twentieth century, liberty was not a hierarchical
collection of discrete activities, some more valued than others,
but a continuum as integrated as a human life. The relevant
case law acknowledges this. 0
In Mugler v. Kansas,3' one of the first interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court consid-
ered a claim that the prohibition laws of Kansas deprived a
brewer of liberty and property without due process of law. In a
majority opinion spanning twenty-two pages of the United
States Reports, at most only two paragraphs even generously
could be characterized as a discussion of the existence or con-
tours of a "right."33 Although the existence of some unarticulated
right and some interference with that right went unquestioned,
the Court started from the unhesitating position that "[n]o one
may rightfully do that which the law-making power, upon rea-
sonable grounds, declares to be prejudicial to the general wel-
fare."3' Thus, the bulk of the Court's opinion focused on the
reach of state power-a question that would, in turn, depend
upon the reasons for which the state had passed its law.35 In re-
sponse to that question, the Court concluded that "it [cannot] be
said that government interferes with or impairs any one's consti-
tutional rights of liberty or of property, when it determines that
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks... are, or may
become, hurtful to society, and constitute, therefore, a business
in which no one may lawfully engage."36 The statute survived
because the state had a valid reason for passing it.
The Lochner case itself took the same approach in 1905Y.3 The
challenge in that case, of course, involved a state law limiting
30. See infra notes 31-67 and accompanying text
31. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
32. See id. at 653, 657.
33. See id. at 662-63.
34. Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
35. See id. at 663-74.
36. Id. at 662-63.
37. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-65 (1905).
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the working hours of bakers to ten per day or sixty per week.3"
The Court did not pause long in considering whether the peti-
tioner had alleged a constitutional interest. Its discussion of the
nature of the right at stake, if "discussion" is not too generous a
word, comprised three sentences, in which the Court acknowl-
edged the existence of a liberty falling within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Yet, the Court understood liberty
to be "held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by
the governing power of the state in the exercise of those powers
[relating to safety, health, morals, and general welfare], and
with such conditions the Fourteenth Amendment was not de-
signed to interfere."4 ° Consequently, the rest of the majority
opinion focused upon the state's reasons for passing the law
under review.41 In contrast to the statute in Mugler, but under
the same legal framework, the statute in Lochner did not sur-
vive because the state failed to persuade- the Court that its rea-
sons for passing it were, in fact, based on sincere notions of the
common good.42
In 1908, the Court applied the same standard in Muller v.
Oregon,' concluding that the state had offered a valid reason for
curtailing the liberty of employers and their female employees to
contract for the number of working hours." In Muller, the Court
credited the state's claim that the specific characteristics of
women justified state intervention in an otherwise free market
relationship. 5 It is undeniable that the nature of the liberty
here and the degree of interference with this personal liberty are
identical to those involved in Lochner only three years prior. The
difference in outcomes is a result of what reasons the state of-
38. See id. at 52.
39. See id. at 53.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 53-65.
42. See id. at 62-63 (acknowledging "a suspicion that there was some other motive
dominating the legislature than the purpose to subserve the public health or wel-
fare"). For further discussion of these reasons, see infra notes 67-112 and accompa-
nying text.
43. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
44. See id. at 421-23 (holding that a woman's physical structure and maternal
responsibilities were valid reasons to restrict the hours of employment of women).
45. See id.
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fered for curtailing that liberty. Liberty, forty years after pas-
sage of the Fourteenth Amendment, still achieved its contours in
terms of the state's reasons for limiting it.' Without recognizing
that the nature of the liberty is not a controlling factor, one
would have to conclude that these two cases were irreconcilable.
There is, however, a consistency in the analysis when one dis-
cerns the critical role of the state's reasons in the shaping of the
liberty interest itself.
Much of the language in Lochner and the other state-law
cases in which the Court discussed a state's reasons for legisla-
tion might be construed to suggest that the important question
is simply whether the state has the power to pass the act under
its police powers.47 Coincidentally, the general legislative power
of a state government, given the name "police powers," is defined
by categories that involve the reasons for regulation-health,
safety, and morals.48 Thus, in the liberty cases in which the bulk
of the Court's analysis involves the state's reasons for its leg-
islation, it is difficult to tell whether these reasons are part of
the analysis of the due process claim, or instead are simply an
analysis of whether the power exists in the state to pass the law
at issue under its police powers. The actual language of the
opinions might equally permit of either interpretation. If it were
only the latter, however, and the sole issue was whether the
state had the power to pass the law, an individual claim of con-
stitutional violation (other than some injury sufficient to provide
standing) would be unnecessary to invalidate the law. If the
state were without power to pass the law because it did not fall
46. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 437-39 (1917) (upholding a law
requiring overtime wages in factories because of sufficient evidence of health-related
purpose); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1915) (striking down a law prohibit-
ing employers from imposing non-union status as a condition of employment because
of the lack of a purpose related to health, safety, morals, or public welfare).
47. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1905).
48. At a deeper level, this is no coincidence. The nature of liberty in a free soci-
ety has important connections to the powers of government, the purposes for which
social compacts are entered into, and the like. The term "coincidentally" is used here
only to emphasize that the inquiry into whether liberty has been impaired uncon-
stitutionally is separate from the inquiry into whether power exists to pass the law,
even though in the case of states the inquiries involve the same question-whether
the law is passed for the common good.
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within the bounds of its police power, then any claim to liberty
would be superfluous. Under these circumstances, the state
would be utterly without power to pass the law, resulting in an
invalid law that would be simply without effect.
The Court's consistent and serious discussion of reasons in
this entire line of liberty cases under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, however, has a more significant purpose than merely to
show that the laws at issue are or are not within the regulatory
power of the state. Rather, the nature of the state's reasons is a
part of the analysis of the liberty claim itself; liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment is shaped and refined by the reasons
offered to curtail it. The nature of the liberty right granted by
the Fourteenth Amendment is that an individual holds freedoms
subject to the legitimate needs of the general public. Understood
this way, liberty is a relational concept reflecting the individual's
relationship to the community, for whose benefit alone liberty
may be restricted. This interpretation finds support in the cases
in which the litigant claiming an infringement of liberty chal-
lenges a federal, not a state, law. This is an important distinc-
tion because the powers of the federal government, unlike those
of the states, are not clearly defined by the purposes for which
the government legislates. 49 For the federal government, the
Constitution enumerates these powers by reference to the ob-
jects of the legislation. As a result, it should be possible to dis-
cern whether a claim of a liberty violation itself requires an ex-
amination of government reasons for its laws. If not, then one
49. One could argue that Congress's motives in legislating were important to the
Court in determining whether its laws fell within the enumerated powers, at least
before United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), in which the Court held that if
the regulation was one of commerce, Congress's motive in passing it was irrelevant.
See id. at 113-15. The motive analysis in that case, however, involved different con-
cerns from those discussed here, and focused on whether the commerce power re-
quired Congress to have a commercial reason for passing the law, as opposed to
motives inspired by morality or justice. See id. at 115; cf Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964) (upholding the validity of Title 11 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as applied to privately owned restaurants affecting interstate commerce).
It may be that some version of the motive inquiry will return to Commerce Clause
analysis after United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-63 (1995) (holding that a
law prohibiting gun possession in a school zone did not affect interstate commerce
because gun possession is not commercial), but that has no bearing on the discus-
sion in text.
[Vol. 41:65
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would expect that the Court would not adopt, in cases involving
due process challenges to federal laws, the analysis of whether
the law had been passed for the common good. That question is
not relevant to the existence of federal power as such. Rather,
the appropriate inquiry would be whether the federal govern-
ment possessed the power to pass the law under the terms of
Article I, Section 8.50 Interestingly, however, when this issue
arose the Court still searched for evidence of a common good.
In Adair v. United States,5" the Court confronted the critical
question whether a federal law prohibiting interstate carriers
from discharging employees on account of union membership
unconstitutionally deprived the employers and employees of
liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.52 The Court used interesting means to conclude
that the law deprived both groups of due process.5" First, it took
up the familiar rhetoric about freedom of contract, quoting liber-
ally from the writings of Thomas Cooley.' The Court then dis-
cussed the Lochner case at length, including that opinion's em-
phasis on the police powers of the states.55 Having provided this
doctrinal backdrop, with no mention of any difference that might
arise out of the fact that this case concerned the federal govern-
ment and the Fifth Amendment rather than a state and the
Fourteenth, the Court stated the applicable rule of law: "[Tihe
rights of liberty and property guaranteed by the Constitution
against deprivation without due process of law, [are] subject to
such reasonable restraints as the common good or the general
welfare may require ... ."" It found no legitimate function of
government that would justify such a restraint on an
individual's freedom to retain the personal services of another,
and concluded that the law at issue consequently violated the
Fifth Amendment.57
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
51. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
52. See id. at 168-72.
53. See id. at 178-80.
54. See id. at 173.
55. See id. at 173-74.
56. Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
57. See i&i at 180. This is the point on which Justice McKenna's dissent dis-
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As a separate matter, however, the Court addressed an odd
claim by the government that the authority to pass the law "can
be referred to the power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce, without regard to any question of personal liberty or
right of property arising under the Fifth Amendment.""8 This
claim seemed to suggest that even if the law transgressed the
right to liberty, it should still survive if the government pos-
sessed the substantive regulatory power under the Commerce
Clause to pass it. If the government's argument was odd, the
Court's response was even odder. It found that substantive pow-
er over interstate commerce did not exist, precisely because the
law transgressed the right to liberty. The Court stated that "the
power to regulate interstate commerce, great and paramount as
that power is, cannot be exerted in violation of any fundamental
right secured by other provisions of the Constitution."59 Thus,
failing as a provision for the common good, this law violated,
first, the Due Process Clause, and then, as a consequence, the
Commerce Clause as well. This awkward analysis makes clear
that the question of impermissible encroachment on liberty is
separate from that of regulatory power. 0 This law violated the
Fifth Amendment for the same reason that the statute in
Lochner violated the Fourteenth: it infringed liberty without
serving the common good.61
agreed. The dissenting opinion found both a public purpose and a connection to
interstate commerce in the regulation, and thus found that the statute neither vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment nor exceeded Congress's powers under the interstate
commerce clause. See id. at 182-90 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 176.
59. Id. at 179-80. Although there was precedent for a holding that the act simply
exceeded the power of Congress under its commerce power and therefore was with-
out effect, see, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895), the
Court chose not to resolve the case on that ground.
60. See Adair, 208 U.S. at 180.
61. Justice Holmes's dissent confirmed this characterization of the majority opin-
ion: "The ground on which this particular law is held bad is not so much that it
deals with matters remote from commerce among the States, as that it interferes
with the paramount individual rights, secured by the Fifth Amendment." Id at 191
(Holmes, J., dissenting). In response to the majority's holding, Justice Holmes stated
that he "could not pronounce it unwarranted if Congress should decide that to foster
a strong union was for the best interest, not only of the men, but of the railroads
and the country at large." Id. at 192 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes refuted the
majority's conclusion regarding the Fifth Amendment with a statement that the law
[Vol. 41:65
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The Court's analysis in Adair says something important about
the constitutional right to liberty. Whatever the basis of the
regulatory authority that may be exerted, the individual holds a
right not to be interfered with except as necessary for the com-
mon good. It suggests that the reasons the government offers to
support its restraints on liberty will shape the contours of the
liberty itself. Significantly, the analysis does not necessarily re-
quire an examination of what type of liberty is at stake, but only
the validity of the state's reasons for curtailing it, measured
against a standard of the common good. That standard, the
common good, once apparently a reasonably clear standard
against which to measure state action, was still the benchmark,
but becoming more and more difficult to define.62
The vision of what the right to liberty guarantees did not
nominally change with the advent of the New Deal.6" In 1925,
the Court described the liberty right as one that "may not be
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State."6 In 1934, the
Court reaffirmed that "regulation... is unconstitutional only if
arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the pol-
icy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary
and unwarranted interference with individual liberty."5 These
statements of the same rule undoubtedly contained different
indeed could be considered in the interest of the common good, confirming the rela-
tionship between the common good and the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause. See id. at 191 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525, 546-54 (1923) (resolving a Fifth Amendment liberty claim against a
minimum wage law passed by Congress for the District of Columbia by applying the
standard from state cases in which the state must offer a valid reason in the inter-
est of the public welfare to justify interference with freedom of contract).
62. The Adair opinion, with its peculiar vacillation between rights and powers,
may have signaled a period of transition for the Court, in which the prior important
understanding of the common good as a defining influence on the right to liberty
was undergoing change.
63. See CASS R SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 25 (1993) (arguing that
"the antiauthoritarian impulse, understood as a requirement of reasons, lies at the
heart of American constitutional law"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 8-7, at 582-85 (2d ed. 1988) ("[1]t is significant that the Court never
wholly abandoned the position that legislatures, at least in their regulatory capacity,
must always act in furtherance of public goals . . . ).
64. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
65. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
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nuances in expression that reflected undeniable changing atti-
tudes about expanding state power. These articulations focused
more on the means the state might choose to achieve its ends
than on the validity of the ends themselves. Yet even during this
period, the Court still voiced a principle that the state's reasons
for restricting liberty would determine constitutional validity. In
1937, the Court announced the rule again: "[Rlegulation which
is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process."6 Although "the in-
terests of the community" is admittedly a weaker phrase than
"the common good" of the prior generation, it seems that the
Court still retained some allegiance to a rule requiring it to ex-
amine state reasons for legitimacy. A significant problem for the
New Deal Court was that changing understandings of the com-
mon good left it with little in the way of limits on legitimate
state reasons, and consequently little that the Court's scrutiny
could achieve.
II. REASONS AND TRANSLATION
This Essay argues that, very early on in our constitutional
history, a principle developed that proclaimed "[a]n exercise of
legislative powers would be considered valid only if it could
reasonably be justified as contributing to the general welfare.""
This principle embodied a variant of the equality principle, that
one of the protections a free people enjoy is the guarantee that
laws always will be passed for the good of all, and not for the
private benefit or emolument of particular, favored individuals
or interests.68 The notion inhered in the very idea of government
66. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); see also United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (stating the Court's assump-
tion that a statute would violate due process if its challenger were precluded from
showing the legislature had no valid reason for passing the challenged law).
67. GILLMAN, supra note 26, at 49.
68. See i& at 49, 54 (n[lit was assumed that this emphasis on equality would
have as one of its residual benefits the protection of important individual liberties.");
see also Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 8 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554, 555 (1831) ("The rights of
every individual must stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every
other member of the body politic, or land, under similar circumstances; and every
partial, or private law which directly proposes to destroy individual rights ... is
unconstitutional and void.").
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itself, as well as in the liberal vision of the reasons for having
instituted government in the first instance.69 Just as, in a mon-
archy, favored status could be bestowed on particular friends of
the ruler thereby threatening liberty for all, in a democraicy,
favored status could be bestowed on factions or groups that were
able to win a disproportionate share of legislative beneficence.70
These consequences were to be resisted and feared. The princi-
ple of the common good responded to these fears by requiring
that states have reasons, related to the common good, to justify
interferences with the liberty of individuals.71
The cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty
clause pervasively reflect this commitment. The question in each
case was whether the state had offered, in defense of its re-
straint on liberty, a reason related to the common good. The
importance of this showing by the state is illustrated by compar-
ing Lochner with Muller v. Oregon,72 the case decided just three
years later, but having the opposite outcome. Both cases in-
volved challenges to state laws limiting the working hours of
certain workers.73 In Lochner, the law applied to bakers;74 in
Muller, it applied to women employed in factories or laundries.75
69. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Court noted this historical fact:
When the people of the United Colonies separated from Great Brit-
ain . .. Itihey retained for the purposes of government all the powers of
the British Parliament, and through their State constitutions, or other
forms of social compact, undertook to give practical effect to such as they
deemed necessary for the common good and the security of life and prop-
erty.
Id. at 124.
70. See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re.Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez.Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HISr. REV. 293,
314-26 (198.5) (comparing a modem legislature's passage of "special legislation" that
benefits only a small percentage of the overall constituency to a king's favoritism
during feudal times).
71. See id; see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AIERICAN UNION 1226 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 1927)
("'The dimensions of the government's police power are identical with the dimensions
of the government's duty to protect and promote the public welfare.'" (quoting Leon-
ard v. State, 127 N.E. 464, 465 (Ohio 1919))).
72. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
73. See id. at 418-19; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905).
74. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52-53.
75. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 418-19.
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In Lochner, the Court found no public purpose served by the
law; it was deemed class legislation and therefore rendered void
as a violation of the individual's right to freedom of contract.76 In
Muller, the Court responded to an argument framed along the
same lines by making a significant statement on its way to up-
holding the law.7" The Court stated: "As healthy mothers are
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of [a]
woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race."78 The Court did not
merely find that reasons might exist why women needed extra
protection for their own health; such a finding might have justi-
fied, in some measure, protective legislation, but would still
have failed, in the eyes of some, to provide the "public purpose"
so essential to validity. Rather, the Court constructed an argu-
ment for the impact on the common weal of the exploitation of
women workers, and thus supplied the public purpose required
by precedent.
The Court decided Muller in 1908, not in the 1930s, and pro-
vided the first example of the Court's evolving approach to the
task of applying the constitutional rule. The old principle of
constitutional law required the Court to seek a public purpose in
the regulation that would justify a restraint on liberty. In Mul-
ler, this meant that the Court must- search for a public purpose
in a law restricting the working hours of women in factories.
Applying this constitutional principle, the Court found that the
circumstances of the changing times supplied a new public pur-
pose that might not have existed in prior ages.79 Yet the consti-
tutional principle itself remained unchanged.
In 1937, a similar analysis appeared in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish,80 the case credited with overruling Lochner."1 Despite
76. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62-64.
77. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. See id. at 420-23.
80. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
81. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (opinion of
O'Connor, Souter, Kennedy, JJ.) (stating West Coast Hotel "signaled the demise of
Lochner"); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLEs AND POLICIES 489
(1997).
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this claim to fame, West Coast Hotel did not repudiate the long-
standing constitutional principle, applied in Lochner, that a
state may curtail liberty only as necessary for the common good.
In that respect, West Coast Hotel no more overruled Lochner
than any decision finding a criminal confession to be voluntary
overrules Miranda v. Arizona. 2 Indeed, the Court in West Coast
Hotel explicitly articulated its quest for a public purpose to justi-
fy the minimum wage law at issue, as follows:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal
position with respect to bargaining power and are thus rela-
tively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not
only detrimental to their health and well being but casts a
direct burden for their support upon the community. What
these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to
pay .... The community is not bound to provide what is in
effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers."
Although one may criticize the soundness of this reasoning on
economic grounds," one cannot deny that the quoted statement
supplies what consistently had been required to justify a curtail-
ment of liberty. Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court had required the state to show a public, com-
mon purpose for the law at issue because such a showing as-
sured critics that the law was neither class legislation nor gov-
ernment by favoritism, but was a measure designed to benefit
the community. That is what always had been required, and the
Court required it in West Coast Hotel. In that respect, nothing
had changed.
This is not to trivialize the changes that took place in due
process jurisprudence between 1905 and 1937. Great numbers of
scholars in many disciplines have written volumes on the ques-
tion of how to explain the Lochner-Era cases and the changes
that followed.85 Certainly the many legal, political, philosophical,
82. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (applying the Fifth Amendments self-incrimination clause
to police interrogations).
83. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
84. See Meese, supra note 1, at 46-49.
85. See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980); Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, GEO. MAsON L. REv., Winter 1988,
at 5; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV.
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and historical insights that come to us from those pages cannot
be summarized here with any degree of fairness or accuracy.86
For purposes of this Essay, however, one point is especially
important.
The changes were not redefinitions of constitutional principle
or liberty. They were changes in the understanding of what con-
stituted a valid public purpose of government. There is nothing
trivial about that concept. Yet it is a matter of applying a con-
stitutional principle, not a matter of devising a constitutional
principle. When an interpreter seeks to apply a constitutional
principle to a changed world, she first must acquire the same
types of information that an intentionalist would wish to ac-
quire, to familiarize herself with the context in which the princi-
ple would have been understood at the time of its adoption. 7
Her object is to grasp the original meaning as best she can and
carry it across to the changed context of her own contemporary
circumstances, while remaining true to the etymological roots of
the word "interpret": to go between.8 Here, the interpreter seeks
to preserve the meaning of the liberty clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the face of drastically changing social, govern-
mental, and economic conditions. As demonstrated above, the
original understanding of the liberty clause permitted a state to
restrain the liberty of an individual only for reasons designed to
promote the common good.8" Proponents of the conservative
critique have offered copious evidence of the views of the nine-
211 (1993); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988); Her-
bert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309 (1995)
(reviewing OWEN M. FSS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE (1994));
Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York Rehabilitated and Revised, but Still Reviled, 1995
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 31 (1995); Michael J. Phillips, The Progressiveness of the Lochner
Court, 75 DENY. U. L. REv. 453 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
86. See generally Barry Friedman, The Lessons of Lochner (The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 2B) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
William and Mary Law Review) (discussing different accounts of the-Lochner Era
with regard to judicial review).
87. See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 214 (1993).
88. See id. at 214-15 & n.200 (citing THE AmERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 685, 1534 (1976)).
89. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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teenth-century, laissez-faire advocates like Thomas Cooley, early
courts, and scholars to establish that in the original understand-
ing of this principle, the notion of "common good" was taken to
preclude laws benefitting any subset of the community, any
class-specific legislation, and certainly any purely redistributive
legislation. 0 Thus, it appears that the founders of the Four-
teenth Amendment assumed that purely redistributive or pater-
nalistic legislation, at least as applied to adult men, does not
serve the common good. More generally, the founding communi-
ty assumed that the individual man was the atomistic center of
society, and that the absence of government intervention most
securely protected his liberty to engage in consensual, non-
fraudulent economic transactions.9'
The interpreter of 1937 did not live in a world that shared
those assumptions. By that time, the suffering of workers and
the changes in the economic and social order had persuaded
many that liberty was not protected adequately without regula-
tion,92 and that indeed the absence of governmental interference
90. See Meese, supra note 1, at 41 & nn.178-82; supra note 2.
91. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 (1887) ("Those rights are best se-
cured, in our government, by the observance, upon the part of all, of such regula-
tions as are established by competent authority to promote the common good.").
Justice Jackson expressed the thought with characteristic elegance:
[Tihe task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,
conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth
century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of
the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence. These principles
grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was
the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere ab-
sence of governmental restraints, and that government should be entrust-
ed with few controls and only the mildest supervision over men's affairs.
We must transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire con-
cept or principle of non-interference has withered at least as to economic
affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer
integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmen-
tal controls. These changed conditions often deprive precedents of reliabil-
ity and cast us more than we would choose upon our own judgment.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943).
92. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (opinion of
O'Connor, Souter, Kennedy, JJ.) ("[T]he lesson.., seemed unmistakable to most
people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom protected in Adkins
rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively
unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."); Lawrence Lessig,
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into the economic affairs of the working public was harmful to
the public good-an irony in which the application of the princi-
ple undermines the value embodied in the principle itself." This
offers a perfect example of the observation that one who insists
on adherence to the specific understandings of the founders, "ig-
noring changes in context, changes rather than preserves mean-
ing... [and] defeats rather than advances fidelity." 4 The Court
responded to this realization by supplying a new application of
the constitutional principle-a new understanding, in the lan-
guage of the old rule, of what "the common good" demanded. 5
When Professor Meese criticizes the economic soundness of
the government's justifications for New Deal legislation in the
1930s, he asks too much of the interpretative process. He is not
content to allow the Court to apply to liberty claims the then-
current notions of what the common good may have required.
Rather, he demands that these notions actually be correct, when
analyzed in hindsight by later evaluative standards. He now
finds the suggested rationale for the common good unpersuasive
under current economic analysis, and consequently concludes
that the interpretation itself was invalid at the time it was
made.97 He overlooks, however, the very important feature of the
Court's job in enforcing the constitutional principle: that it en-
sure, not legislative perfection in attaining its goals, but only a
legitimate effort at promoting the common good. Even in
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 460-61
(1995) ("[The Court points to the facts learned during the recent Depression, to facts
the Court can take judicial notice' of, to facts that reveal the public interest affected
by this legislation . . . [to] preserve . . . [under traditional police power] the state
power to regulate.").
93. See TRIBE, supra note 63, § 8-7, at 585 ("[1f... [West Coast Hotel] was right
and . . . [Lochner] wrong, the reason can only be that, in twentieth century Ameri-
ca, minimum wage laws, as a substantive matter, are not intrusions upon human
freedom in any constitutionally meaningful sense, but are instead entirely reasonable
and just ways of attempting to combat economic subjugation and human domina-
tion.").
94. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165, 1188 (1993).
95. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
96. See Meese, supra note 1, at 48 (suggesting that the Court's analysis in West
Coast Hotel was illegitimate because "[flew, if any, modem economists believe that
minimum wage laws would have averted the Great Depression, or that the regula-
tion of working conditions is an effective tool of macroeconomic stabilization").
97. See id. at 48-51.
[Vol. 41:65
THE FRAGMENTED LIBERTY CLAUSE
Lochner, the Court asked for only "a reasonable ground" for
legislative action, a ground that is not "too shadowy and thin to
build any argument for the interference of the legislature."8
Historically, what has been sought is an assurance that the stat-
ute has a plausible basis; perfect wisdom and accuracy on the
part of the legislature has never been a prerequisite for decision-
making by either the legislature or the judiciary. The opinions of
the New Deal Court demonstrate the effort that a legitimate
interpretation requires.
The case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell9
offers a paradigmatic example of this type of interpretation of
constitutional principle. Although that case involved the Con-
tracts Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, its reasoning
so aptly illustrates the process I describe that it deserves de-
tailed mention here. In Blaisdell, during the midst of the De-
pression, the State of Minnesota passed a measure providing
relief for homeowners threatened with foreclosure."° The law
allowed the postponement of mortgage sales and periods of re-
demption, in violation of the contractual terms of the debt in-
struments.01 The creditors challenged the law as a violation of
the Contracts Clause, but the Supreme Court upheld the law.1"2
The Court did not dispute the dissent's persuasive showing that
if ever there were a situation that presented exactly the evil
that the Contracts Clause had been designed to prevent, it was
this case. Indeed, the Framers had worried specifically about
class legislation such as this, which favored debtors at the ex-
pense of creditors and relieved one side of a bargain of its con-
tractual obligations for the private benefit of the other side.03
How could the majority possibly reconcile the Minnesota law
with the Framers' commitment to preventing this very type of
favoritism? It did so in one critical sentence:
Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only the concerns
of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those of
98. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62 (1905).
99. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
100. See id. at 416.
101. See i at 417-18.
102. See id. at 444-48.
103. See Benedict, supra note 70, at 311.
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the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been
found that the fundamental interests of the State itself are
directly affected; and that the question is no longer merely
that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the
use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure
upon which the good of all depends." 4
This was not so much an articulation of a change in political
theory as it was a description of a change in economic reality.
Atomistic, individual concerns had become common, societal
concerns. Although the Framers assumed, reasonably, that this
type of legislation would benefit only individuals or classes in
1789, the Blaisdell Court, again reasonably, saw that, under
then-prevailing economic conditions, the very same legislation in
1934 would indeed serve a broad public purpose." 5 In order to
serve the meaning of the constitutional rule requiring such a
public purpose, the Court thought itself obliged to abandon its
original application of the rule. Thus, it consciously avoided the
phenomenon of the originalist's betrayal of fidelity: "[WIith a
growing recognition of public needs and the relation of individu-
al right to public security, the court has sought to prevent the
perversion of the clause through its use as an instrument to
throttle the capacity of the States to protect their fundamental
interests."16 By finding in the new social order a public interest
in the enforcement of the individual contracts under the extraor-
dinary conditions of the Depression, the Court embarked on the
same mode of interpretation that also led the same Court to
consider the larger effect of employment relations on the public
as a whole in the due process arena.
To summarize, the notion of liberty as a function of a relation-
ship between an individual and the state's legitimate public
needs survived the New Deal. Both the Lochner-Era Court and
subsequent courts, through the time of the New Deal, remained
faithful to a constant notion of constitutional principle based on
their understanding of liberty.10 7 Those who charge that the
104. Blaisdell, .290 U.S. at 442.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 443-44.
107. See supra notes 46 and 63-66 and accompanying text.
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Lochner-Era judges illegitimately imposed their own laissez-faire
political values on the law, without a genuine care for liberty
under the Constitution, bear the burden of explaining why these
same judges upheld many state regulations of business of vari-
ous kinds during this same period."' 8 The same Supreme Court
that struck down the statute in Lochner also upheld numerous
state laws providing for various types of regulatory interference
with private commercial activity, including railroad rates, mini-
mum wages, and professional licensing requirements-laws
anathema to the laissez-faire vision of government.1"9 These
decisions stressed that the laws were valid because the state
had a legitimate reason for enacting them."0 The interference
with the private economic order was no less severe than in the
cases in which the Court struck down the law. The difference
was that in some cases the state persuaded the Court that the
measure was in fact an effort to provide for the common good-a
variable that has no place at all in the absolute thinking of true
laissez-faire philosophy. The success of the so-called "Brandeis
Brief""' during this period, known for provision of social empiri-
cal data,, shows that the Court was interested in refining its
notion of what the public good required, rather than ritualisti-
cally condemning all innovative state acts as partial legislation
at odds with the laissez-faire tradition. This, in turn, suggests
an interest in giving meaningful content to the constitutional
notion of liberty."
108. Those in the other camp, who applaud the Lochner Court for adhering to an
ardent commitment to the absolute protection of economic rights as against all incur-
sions from state government, bear the same burden of explanation for the lack of
uniformity in results.
109. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding maximum-hours
and overtime law); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum-hours
law for women in laundries); Holden v. Handy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding maxi-
mum-hours law for miners); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding prohi-
bition law); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (upholding regulation fixing ware-
housing rates).
110. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
111. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 419 (identifying social science data as an important
factor relevant to issues facing the state).
112. Support for this conclusion comes from a source with a different perspective.
See Benedict, supra note 70, at 305 (arguing that the courts of the period did not
simply pull substantive due process out of thin air in order to protect the privileged
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III. WHERE THE CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE (AND THE WARREN
COURT) WENT WRONG
Things did change, but not in the 1930s when most people say
they changed. Things changed in the 1960s, during the rights
revolution, on the watch of the Warren Court. During that time
the Supreme Court began to lose its moorings in understanding
the meaning of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The first significant change came in 1963, when the Supreme
Court decided Ferguson v. Skrupa.11 3 The Court might have
resolved this challenge to a Kansas law on the ground that the
state's prohibition of the practice of debt adjusting except as
incident to the practice of law served a public purpose, and thus
kept the flame of constitutional liberty alive, at least nominally;
however, the Court did not do so. Instead, Justice Black, writing
for the Court, interpreted the earlier expansion of what might
constitute a public good in the New Deal cases as an abandon-
ment of any requirement that there be a public good underlying
the passage of a law. 14 Reflecting the widespread skepticism of
legal thought at the time, Justice Black derided the notion that
judges could determine whether a statute is for the public good
without simply "substitut[ing] their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass
laws."115 Accordingly, he disavowed any role for the courts what-
soever in enforcing the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which he did not count as a "specific federal constitutional
prohibition"11 at all. This marked a radical departure from ex-
isting law. 17
classes, but instead adhered to a time-honored aversion to self-dealing by those in
power, translated to cover what they perceived as class legislation-a threat to an
American heritage of liberty).
113. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
114. See id. at 730.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 731.
117. Justice Harlan's brief concurrence in the judgment, on the ground that the act
bore "a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective," demonstrates
that he, too, viewed the majority opinion as abandoning the established constitution-
al test. Id. at 733 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The second change came in 1965, in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut. 18 Commentators often view Griswold as a great step for-
ward for the enforcement of liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a major piece of structural support in the edifice of
the rights revolution." 9 Although it was an explicit reaffirmation
that some type of liberty lies beyond the reach of state power, it
came as a mixed blessing. Instead of robustly reclaiming the
constit~utional principle that had prevailed since the nineteenth
century-that individual liberty may not be curtailed by the
state except as necessary to promote the common good-the
majority in Griswold adopted a peculiarly defensive posture.
The first sign of trouble appeared when the Court opened its
analysis by disavowing the liberty cases, such as Lochner, and
conspicuously failed to characterize the issue before it as a ques-
tion of the enforcement of liberty under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment at all. 20 Instead of framing the issue as a claim that had
centuries of common law precedent behind it, the Court grasped
for provisions of the Bill of Rights-perhaps feeling the need to
supply the "specific federal constitutional prohibitions" of which
Justice Black had spoken in Skrupa."2 ' It chose to offer the fa-
mous "penumbras" argument, wedging the marital privacy at
issue in the case into the status of some shadow of a protected
right.122 Griswold was the first case in a hundred years of liberty
cases in which the focus of the Court's analysis rested on the
nature of the right rather than on the nature of the state's rea-
sons for limiting it. By making the right itself the issue and
defending it in this unconventional and ultimately unpersuasive
way, the Court left liberty weakened and ripe for fragmentation.
Apparently, the Griswold Court took literally the extreme
rights-skeptical view of Justice Black in Skrupa, as testament
118. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
119. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 950-51 (3d ed. 1996);
David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 7, 27 (1999); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 981, 994, 998-99 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning
from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated Con-
stitutional Rights, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 433, 445 (1992).
120. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-83.
121. See Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 731.
122. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
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that the Court was no longer in the business of protecting liber-
ty under the Due Process Clause. Although the cases upon
which this conclusion rested, such as West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, did not demand that interpretation, the Griswold ma-
jority was not willing to take on the skeptics' derisive indictment
in favor of a continued adherence to the principle of protected
liberty.
At the same time, the invasion of liberty at stake in Griswold,
prohibition on the use of contraceptives by married couples,
seemed more difficult to tolerate than the obliteration of a debt-
adjuster's profession in Skrupa. Faced with the two conflicting
realizations-that the Court no longer enforced liberty and that
the statute in Griswold seemed to go too far in legislating pri-
vate matters-the Court was in a bind. Instead of abandoning
either one of those conflicting commitments, the Court chose to
distinguish the line of cases that had been interpreted in Skrupa
as the death knell of liberty enforcement. 12 Consequently, the
Court concluded that there could be different kinds of liberty,
some of which could receive judicial protection under the Due
Process Clause and some of which could not. The decision to
fragment the ancient notion of liberty and make constitutional
protection depend on the qualitative nature of the human activi-
ty at stake was unprecedented.
It was also a step backward for the protection of liberty. In-
stead of applying the old general rule that all liberty would be
protected, subject to valid state reasons for interference, the
Court now would recognize a special category of preferred free-
doms, termed "fundamental" liberties, that alone would receive
meaningful protection from state abridgment. 124 The notion of
protecting "fundamental rights" may sound progressive, but it
severely restricts the number and kind of freedoms that receive
any protection at all and invites the erection of higher and high-
er hurdles to those seeking to claim that their right is, in fact,
fundamental. 12 5 After Griswold, only one right, abortion, has
123. See id. at 482.
124. See id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
125. The subsequent cases bear this out. Not since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), has a litigant succeeded in attaining entrance for a new right into the elite
club of those deemed "fundamental." See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
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been added to the list of preferred freedoms, and it no longer
holds that status."6 Accordingly, the seeds of rights-skepticism
sown by Alexander Bickel, when he charged that judicial review
is a deviant institution in a democracy,2 7 were nourished by
Justice Black in his attack on judicial subjectivity, and ultimate-
ly bore fruit, ironically, in Griswold v. Connecticut.'
What the Warren Court did wrong, the conservative critique
of substantive due process does equally wrong. Professor Meese's
paper examines the cases through the past century and sees
liberty of contract or liberty to pursue an occupation protected in
the early days and not protected in the later days.' In each
case, he looks to the nature of the particular liberty and the
nature of the limitation on market freedom.130 He concludes that
today "some forms of liberty, such as privacy, find shelter in the
Constitution, while other forms, such as the right to pursue an
occupation, may be trammeled by the legislature at will."1 3 1 "if
the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component," he
charges, "[Justice Souter] does not provide a valid explanation
for the differential treatment of economic rights and so-called
personal rights, such as the right of privacy."1 2 What Professor
Meese's analysis fails to recognize is the central role of reasons
in the analysis of liberty under the Due Process Clause. As a
consequence, he sees great inconsistencies: in one case the Court
finds a restraint constitutional, while in another it strikes down
702 (1997) (refusing to recognize a fundamental right to assisted suicide); Cruzan v.
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (refusing to recognize a fundamental
right to die); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (refusing to recognize a
fundamental right to establish a relationship with one's biological child); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to recognize a fundamental right to choose
sexual partners).
126. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 840 (1992) (applying an "un-
due burden" analysis to the right to abortion and avoiding entirely the use of the
term "fundamental right").
127. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed. 1986).
128. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 531, 550-52 (1998).
129. See Meese, supra note 1, at 11-56.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 8.
132. I at 11.
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a law imposing the same limitation on market freedom. Failing
to acknowledge that the nature of the liberty is not dispositive of
the constitutional inquiry, he is utterly unable to account for the
differences in outcome of the various cases in which the impair-
ment of liberty was challenged. Without this recognition, there
is no doctrine, and it is no wonder that Meese simply gives up
and dismisses the entire century-long venture as the judges'
"unwillingness to protect the sort of economic liberties valued by
the Framers," an exercise of "will and not judgment.""a
The challenge for courts in an era in which a laissez-faire
conception of legitimate state action no longer garnered wide-
spread support was, and remains, to find some way to evaluate
state reasons or "common good" to permit meaningful enforce-
ment of the right to liberty. It cannot be the case that, because
more modern understandings of the public interest and of legis-
lative motivations blur the once-bright line between laws that
serve the common good and those that do not, liberty is simply
swallowed up by any plausible claim of state interest.
CONCLUSION
The central role of reasons in the sound analysis of liberty
under the Constitution is not arbitrary. It captures the heart of
what it means to be a free citizen in a representative democracy.
Although there is tension in the very idea of freedom in a society
of laws, this tension is no excuse for courts simply to abdicate
their responsibility to protect it. Justice Harlan saw this rela-
tionship exactly as history presents it, when he said that "[dlue
process.., has represented the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized soci-
ety."" Harlan's description captured the concept of ordered lib-
erty, which calls for judgment in every case to preserve the "or-
der" without abandoning the "liberty."
Protection of liberty is something that will, and should,
change with the needs of the times. In times of economic crisis,
133. Id. at 63-64. Meese's paper does examine the various justifications offered to
support the laws upheld during the New Deal, and finds them wanting. See id. at
46-56.
134. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the public good may require sacrifices of the more affluent that
would be unjustified in times of plenty.13 5 Without relegating
liberty to contentless categories, it is easy to imagine that state
involvement in the more public activities of an individual in the
marketplace generally may turn out to be more necessary to the
common good than state involvement in the individual's more
private activities. Although that may sound a bit like a bifurca-
tion of liberty into categories, a closer look reveals that the in-
quiry focuses not on the nature of the liberty but on the types of
needs the public is likely to muster for interfering with different
types of activities in which a human being may wish to engage.
Without the indefensible fragmentation of liberty into categories,
the Court could achieve a continuum in which various combina-
tions of freedoms, state needs, and degrees of interference plot
out into a sensible regime, consistent with a coherent under-
standing of freedom and social responsibility in a liberal state.
A formula for reinstating liberty to its place as a protected
right under the Constitution is beyond the goals of this Essay,
but certain guidelines emerge from the theory set forth here.
First, human liberty must be seen as a continuum, and not as a
polarized set of activities, some of which can, by some measure,
be deemed fundamental while others are merely ordinary. Sec-
ond, the need of the state to limit freedom is the only meaning-
ful way to distinguish one state law from another as a matter of
constitutional validity. Finally, the overall value to be served in
trying to make the judgments necessary to interpret the liberty
clause under the first two guidelines is freedom in citizenship,
the balance that is ordered liberty.
135. The Supreme Court may be sensing that it is time to give more protection to
the so-called "economic" freedoms now that the prosperity of much of the community
appears to have reached a relatively stable level. For signs of this emerging protec-
tion of economic freedoms, see Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (recog-
nizing a substantive constitutional limitation on retroactive regulation); BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (recognizing a substantive consti-
tutional limitation on punitive damages); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (recognizing a substantive constitutional limitation on regulato-
ry restraint on use of property).
19991
